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Abstract 
This paper draws parallels between the use of public leisure spaces in the city such as parks and 
squares, and the use of certain forms of digital networks. Similarities between these two sorts of 
social contexts are worth considering, particularly their political dimension. This effortsituates 
the current conversation about social media as sites of political mobilization into dialogue with 
the historical analysis of public parks as spaces that, in a similar fashion, were designed for 
leisure and consumption but was appropriated as sites of resistance. It brings together the 
literature on urban parks as centers of democracy and the literature on new media spaces as 
portals of cyber-protest, extending the spatial history of digital politics. 
Keywords: public sphere, leisure spaces, parks, social media, Web 2.0, protest, political 
activism 
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Introduction 
As political mobilization and expression take place increasingly within public leisure spaces 
online such as social network sites (SNS) of Twitter and Facebook, there is a need to investigate 
digital leisure territories as centers of democracy and sites of protest.  Events such as the ‘Twitter 
revolution’ and the Occupy Wall Street movement have rekindled passion and expectation of the 
virtual realm as a portal of mass activism, where governments, corporations and citizens strive to 
hijack such platforms to fulfill their own agendas (Shirky, 2011). Simultaneously, we witness 
public leisure spaces such as parks and squares serving as focal points of resistance, be it the 
gathering of 50,000 protesters at Tahrir Square in Cairo during the 2011 Egyptian revolution,the 
occupation of Zuccotti Park in New York to the recent Gezi park crackdown by the Turkish 
police where people congregated, camped and voiced their concerns and anger against the loss of 
public space and the growing conservatism  of the government. In fact, the choice of urban parks 
and squares for public protest comes from a deep tradition of mass political activism that span 
across nations (Arora, 2011; Mitchell, 1995; Williams, 2006). This is not to say that urban park 
spaces are exclusive sites for mass activism as protests often spill over to streets and beyond. 
Yet, if we are to look at the historical emergence of urban parks, their spatial design and diverse 
inhabitation, it is astonishing to learn how embedded political action has been within such public 
domains. As D’Arcus (2006) argues, “given the centrality of public spaces to political protest – 
and, in the media age, of the more abstract space of a mediated public sphere – careful analysis 
of how they come to be, how they are regulated, and the precise nature of their connection to 
power and dissent is essential” (p.7). Thereby, this paper considers why certain public leisure 
sites attract political action as well as the range of mediations that enable the transformation of 
these seemingly innocuous spaces into activist spaces. Parallels are drawn between the use of 
3 
 
public leisure spaces in the city, such as parks and squares, and the use of certain forms of digital 
networks to gain a more integrated understanding. Similarities between these two sorts of social 
contexts are worth considering, particularly their political dimension as it situates the current 
conversation about SNS as sites of political mobilization into dialogue with the historical 
analysis of public parks as spaces that, in a similar fashion, were designed for leisure and 
consumption but also appropriated as sites of resistance, extending the spatial history of digital 
politics. 
This paper illustrates this argument by comparing the structure and political enactments 
within urban parks and squares in the United States, United Kingdom and China with cyber-
protests within their respective digital networks. Both material and virtual leisure platforms have 
evoked common reactions: either enthusiasm towards them, seen as a significant expansion of 
democratic public space to the more dismal view of being prime spaces to disarm and manipulate 
the masses through their seemingly unregulated leisurely character. In analyzing events and 
movements that stemmed within urban park locales across these nations, this paper reveals how 
politics and leisure are historically and dialectically tied. In focusing on the range of social 
movements across park and SNS geographies, we discover that protests do not so much detract 
from the park’s primary leisure purpose but often are deliberate products of such infrastructures. 
Further, depending on the regulatory mechanisms of these urban parks, we see protest taking on 
more creative, play-like forms of expression, creating new rituals of communication among 
citizens and the state. Finally, we see a plurality of democracies emerge through the complex 
interplay of the public-private nature of leisure space and political action.  
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Digital network sites as the new political sphere 
“Twitter has been criticized as a time-waster – a way for people to inform their friends 
about the minutiae of their lives, 140 characters at a time. But in the past month, 140 characters 
were enough to shine a light on Iranian oppression and elevate Twitter to the level of change 
agent.” Stating this, Mark Pfeifle (2009), a former national-security adviser, called for Twitter to 
be nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for its role in supporting political uprising against 
despotic rulers across the world. Some argue that SNS platforms such as Facebook lend 
themselves to political communication far more than traditional media spaces given their unique 
design affordances (Neumayer & Raffl, 2008).  As such, it’s argued that their social architecture 
allow for groups to form more easily and information to disseminate quicker through their 
interactive channels. Social technology spaces here are seen as relatively decentralized 
‘leaderless’ networks across demographics or what Coopman (2011) terms as ‘dissentworks’ 
given their unique technological affordances for loosely-distributed political networks. This is 
seen to go along the new progressive political mappings where conformity and ideology have 
been replaced by subjectivity and diversity (della Porta, 2005). In fact, della Porta proposes to 
look at these new forms of political organization as ‘relaxed framing’ which enables people to 
situate multiple and diverse issues and concerns within the same protest event and space. In fact, 
new communication technologies have facilitated coordination of protests around common 
concerns such as the environment, economy, peace, and nuclear disarmament, taking local 
political movements across geographic and cultural borders. These virtual protest sites are 
argued as not being a singular political space, autonomous from state authority (Poster, 2006); 
despite the crossing of social, cultural and economic processes across borders, the state continues 
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to be a key player in mediating movements of people, and defining their rights and benefits 
online and offline. Furthermore, these political spaces are seen as inclusive and yet fragmentary, 
creating multiple alliances, “the netizen might be the formative figure in a new kind of political 
relation, one that shares allegiance to the nation with allegiance to the Net and to planetary  
political spaces it inaugurates” (Poster, 2006; p. 78).  This challenges us to gauge the underlying 
techno-social communicative infrastructures of these sites that allow for the sharing of common 
causes. The popular concept of ‘smartmobs’ (Saveri, Rheingold & Vian 2005) has been extended 
to the political dimension, where social software enables and empowers groups to interconnect, 
and aggregate for activism. Here, crowds are given a more positive connotation, seen as a 
“multitude” that “cannot be reduced to sameness, a difference that remains different…the plural 
singularities of the multitude thus stand in contrast to the undifferentiated unity of people” (Hardt 
& Negri, 2004, p. 99). In other words, virtual public leisure spaces are seen as not just giving rise 
to a new political sphere but also a more sophisticated and complex community of practice. 
Perhaps one of the most visible proponents of social media as a political platform is Clay 
Shirky (2011) who espouses that this networked generation has far more opportunity to engage 
in public speech and undertake collective action than ever before. While being careful to claim 
preordained outcomes of liberation and freedom from these architectures, Shirky does state that 
they “have become coordinating tools for nearly all of the world's political movements, just as 
most of the world's authoritarian governments (and, alarmingly, an increasing number of 
democratic ones) are trying to limit access to it” (2011, p. 2). Much in line with the German 
philosopher Jürgen Habermas (1962/1989), he focuses on the underlying structures of Web 2.0 
that allow for engaged dialogue among citizens, believing that in the long run they serve to 
expand the boundaries of the public sphere. However, Shirky does point out that while 
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undoubtedly these social media sites are used far more for leisure and social purposes than mass 
political activism, they are still formidable spaces to contend with. In fact, some scholars have 
remarked that these leisure properties protect such sites to a great extent from state censorship.  
Zuckerman (2008) for instance argues through his facetious ‘Cute cat theory of digital activism’ 
that banal activities like sharing of cat videos make online leisure sites broader in scope, and 
thereby harder for authorities to crack down and block them. Accordingly, this provides a 
‘conservative dilemma’ where the tension lies between using these leisure platforms for 
government propaganda versus censoring these spaces due to their potential for dissidence. Also, 
these sites have become grounds of economic activity that the state depends on, serving as an 
additional obstacle in the banning of such sites.  This works to the advantage of activists. After 
all, while Web 2.0 “was designed for mundane uses, it can be extremely powerful in the hands of 
digital activists, especially those in environments where free speech is limited” (Zuckerman, 
2008, n.p.).  
The hype around new media platforms as radical and novel political arenas has been 
grounded through empirical evidence where for instance, it was found that face-to-face 
communication served as a key factor in organizing the Egyptian revolution while Twitter was 
claimed by only 13% of respondents as a medium to coordinate the protest (Wilson and Dunn, 
2011). In fact, the celebration of leisure sites as instruments of political change has been viewed 
as corporate usurping of due credit to political communities in these difficult geographies; “my 
fear is that the hype about a Twitter/Facebook/YouTube revolution performs two functions: first, 
it depoliticizes our understanding of the conflicts; second, it whitewashes the role of capitalism 
in suppressing democracy” (Mejias, 2011, p.4). Such corporate branding of mass activism by 
Twitter and Facebook are seen as a common ploy to capitalize on the tremendous human 
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struggle, turning a potential virtual public sphere into another branded empire. As Garnham 
(2000, p. 41) puts it, “the colonization of the public sphere by market forces” can be observed by 
the increasing commercialization of the Internet in general and social networking sites such as 
Facebook, MySpace, YouTube or Flickr in particular. Gladwell (2010) is not convinced of the 
depth of such online political movements where it takes a mere ‘like’ button on Facebook to 
express ones’ solidarity to a cause, with a good distance away from actual grassroots movement 
and commitment.  He terms this superficial engagement as ‘slacktivism,’ highlighting the 
negative effect such digital sites can have on civic responsibility and political participation. He 
laments that, “where activists were once defined by their causes, they are now defined by their 
tools” (n.p). In fact, the fear is that when emphasizing the role of the spatial and technical in 
political mobilization, there is danger of undermining the essence of mass protest – that being the 
deep and long-lasting socio-cultural engagements of a diverse public that is struggling to be 
heard. Hence, while cyber-protest “that reflects the role of alternative online media, online 
protests, and online protest communication in society” is here to stay, it is essential to gain a 
more rooted and broader perspective of these platforms as domains for democracy (Fuchs, 2006, 
p. 275).  
Overall, this paper situates claims of novelty and contention on the relationship between 
virtual leisure platforms and political action by drawing on discourses surrounding a similar 
public leisure space - the urban park. Through this juxtaposition, we can better understand how 
to make sense of the hybrid positioning of these sites as propaganda, commercial and activist 
spaces; how the economics of leisure space can exploit as well as protect; and how the ‘relaxed 
framing’ of such sites create an inclusive public space for political mobilization and expression. 
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In essence, this article explicitly maps the relationship of public leisure space and politics, not as 
a digital invention but as an extension of the rich tradition of the protest parks of the past.  
Protest Parks: Case studies from the United States, United Kingdom and China  
This section explores the political and historical dimension of urban parks and squares in the 
United States, China and the United Kingdom as well as the contemporary usage of social media 
spaces within these contexts for cyber-protest. We examine the permeation of ideology across 
digital and material leisure spaces and their role in the shaping of these architectures. A range of 
playful communicative modes are highlighted that demonstrate the agency and creativity of the 
masses in harnessing these spaces for resistance.  
An ideological and symbolic landscape 
The urban park is a narrative of spatial democracy and expressed ideology: 
From public park to garden city, there have been important moments when the garden in 
its most civic and municipal manifestations has been used by social movements as the 
site of struggle, opposition, and innovation. Sometimes, it has been the very topic itself of 
those activities. These moments can be short-term, temporary, crisis-ridden (as in the 
aggressive riot in the park), or long-term and intended as permanent (as in the 
construction of the new green settlement). What is striking is the frequent idealism or 
utopianism experienced or expressed in this kind of urban public green, as though in 
some ways the garden itself can function as a special zone for the common articulation of 
social change, social experimentation, the critical rejection of some aspects of society, 
and even the confrontation with authority. (McKay, 2011, pp. 12) 
These seemingly innocuous public greens tell a story of political communication and activism, at 
times exhibiting the tension between authority and the masses, and between the elite and the 
proletarian (Mitchell, 1995). The beauty of the social engineering of public space is that intent 
and outcome are often misaligned as human ingenuity pushes the boundaries of these spatial 
imaginaries into realms that are unexpected and challenging. Intrinsic to public leisure space is 
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the fact that across nations, it can serves as a critical forum for mass dissent, capitalizing on a 
hybrid identity and unregulated status, at times transforming into a genuine political space for the 
people (Williams, 2006). Oftentimes, these park spaces were instruments of the state to control 
and mediate the public through propaganda and were used by the private industry to seduce the 
consumption class (Shi, 1998; Roberts, 2001). This section expounds on this above proposition, 
making transparent the parallel to SNS such as Twitter, Facebook and Weibo (China’s twitter) 
where similar discussion abounds on the dictates and permeation of ideologies within these 
leisure spaces and the intersection of state governance, mass activism and commerce reflecting 
their public-private nature.  
For example, the American urban park was designed to be a ‘space of refuge’ by the 
famous park designer of the nineteenth century Frederick Law Olmsted. Commissioned to 
architect parks in Boston, New York, Washington DC, and Louisville, Olmsted collaborated with 
geologists, sanitary engineers, public health doctors, and social theorists “to create civilized, 
peaceful sanctuaries where people could find refuge from the sights and sounds of the 
nineteenth-century city,” and yet “this period saw the emergence of a symbolic landscape of 
protest, which often co-existed uncomfortably as a place of tourism” (Gough, 2000, p. 213). For 
instance, People’s Park in Berkeley California came to be known as a public protest space with 
opposed, and perhaps irreconcilable ideological visions dictating the nature and purpose of its 
leisure space (Mitchell, 1995).  
…activists and the homeless people who used the Park promoted a vision of a space 
marked by free interaction and the absence of coercion by powerful institutions. For 
them, public space was an unconstrained space within which political movements can 
organize and expand into wider arenas…The vision of representatives of the University 
(not to mention planners in many cities) was quite different. Theirs was one of open 
space for recreation and entertainment, subject to usage by an appropriate public that is 
allowed in. Public space thus constituted a controlled and orderly retreat where a properly 
behaved public might experience the spectacle of the city. (pp. 109)  
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Mitchell talks about these contradictory visions where the first was construed as a public space 
where political actors shaped the functioning and scope of activity for mass protest; the second 
vision was a modern conceptualization where civility, commerce and class were privileged over 
what was seen as unsolicited political activity not desired by local businesses or the state. In fact, 
People’s Park was also the spatial territory of the hippies who championed a social revolution 
during the '60s. It was spaces such as this that was usurped by radicals from the Bay Area to 
pioneer the political outlook and cultural style of the New Left movement, launching into 
campaigns against militarism, racism, sexual discrimination, homophobia, mindless 
consumerism and pollution (Barbrook and Cameron, 1996).  This is where the ‘Californian 
ideology’ was born, seeping into the broader culture and influencing the values that helped shape 
Silicon Valley, (the home to several new media founders  such as Facebook, Twitter, 
Foursquare) as we know of today: 
Who would have predicted that, in less than 30 years after the battle for People's Park, 
squares and hippies would together create the Californian Ideology? Who would have 
thought that such a contradictory mix of technological determinism and libertarian 
individualism would become the hybrid orthodoxy of the information age? (Barbrook and 
Cameron, 1996, pp.13) 
 
Howard Rheingold (2000), the well-known guru of the Californian ideology advocates values of 
counter-culture to shape the development of new information technologies and draws a vision 
where community activists replace corporate capitalism and big government with a hi-tech‘gift 
economy’ or free labor for the common good. Bulletin board systems, free chat facilities, and 
open source software are manifested efforts at keeping the struggle for social liberation visible 
and alive. This is despite the lucrative commercial and political involvement in building the 
‘information superhighway.’ New communication technologies, so the argument goes, empower 
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the individual, enhance personal freedom, and radically reduce the power of the nation-state. 
Yet, if we are to look at the reality of the situation, these new media platforms would not have 
been feasible without significant infusion of capital from the American defense budget and the 
close alliance with the corporate giant IBM. Significant efforts of the users, driven by the 
Californian ideology to keep these spaces democratic and accessible are ironically in alignment 
with commercial interests of Apple and Microsoft where products of the social collective 
continues to play a vital role in advancing such information architectures and designs. 
It is worth noting that urban parks and their potential for mass political mobilization is 
not confined as a western phenomenon but rather, can be witnessed across nations. Take for 
instance the Beijing Park in China during the early 20
th
 century. This park provided an arena for 
the city people to participate in China’s political transformation from an imperial to a nation state 
(Shi, 1998). It was designed and positioned at the city center to serve as a standing symbol of 
social change. This stemmed from a vision of reform-minded officials who sought to transform 
Beijing into a modern social sphere. The government intentionally designed its urban park to 
serve their reformist agenda of socializing the public as modern and cultured citizens by offering 
free exhibitions, reading rooms, and pavilions to emphasize the educational function of its public 
parks. These spaces also served as propaganda platforms where campaigns were launched to 
promote public health, encourage moral behavior, and combat illiteracy. However, to the chagrin 
of the state, these parks became sites for frequent mass rallies:  
In spite of a host of rules instituted by the state, much of the activity in parks defied the 
state’s dictate. Far from the intended designs, these parks were used by the people for a 
range of purposes, at times undermining the established institutions and norms; they 
served as critical political forums. (Shi 1998, pp. 220) 
 
Another example is the infamous Tinanmen Square where in 1989, it witnessed a mass scale 
massacre of protesters against the State. This public space was intentionally designed by the state 
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as a symbol of political might of the Chinese party where the architecture reflected its ethos. 
While trees lined the east and west edges of the square, the square itself was open, with neither 
trees nor benches. The square was lit with large lampposts which were fitted with video cameras, 
serving as a prime space for surveillance of public leisure activities (Davis et al., 1995).   
 Interestingly, the Chinese government has approached the digital network space in a 
similar manner wherein instead of blocking the Internet to its citizens, it has used this 
opportunity to signal its modern image on the global stage by fostering a significant and 
impressive digital infrastructure with the ‘great firewall’ surrounding its terrain (Jiang and Xu, 
2009). China now boasts the world’s largest Internet population of 253 million, 19.1% of its 
citizenry. They have created e-government portals across provinces to serve as local venues for 
citizen involvement through online chat forums, serving as symbolic architectures for legitimacy 
of its authority in the information age. Research shows that some underprivileged individuals are 
able to publish their grievances on government web sites and “even though only 7.7% of China’s 
137 million Internet users visit government web sites regularly, they can be a critical mass for 
political activism” (Jiang and Xu, 2009, p. 176). Empirical evidence of these portals revealed 
that while interactive features was not well implemented with close to half of these sites not 
having any chat forums, places such as Zhejiang attracted as many as 200 postings every month 
since its inception in 2004 and Guangdong has a monthly average of about 1,000 entries since 
2003, compared to an international average of 10 entries per month on similar government 
forums. Hence, it is argued that “these online structures help deter business or government 
misconducts and are likely to improve government image and local politics” (p. 185). 
Furthermore, China has the largest community of bloggers in the world, and they have been 
instrumental in exposing official and corporate misdeeds (Hassid, 2012).  However, it is essential 
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to note that for the most part, the Chinese blogosphere (much like that in the West) is largely 
apolitical, wherein bloggers engage in leisure and social pursuits such as sports, cars, the arts, 
and relationships, and yet, at times political conversation seeps through  and gets interwoven 
within this leisure fabric. Oftentimes censorship authorities are aware of these transgressions and 
yet as MacKinnon (2008) argues, blogs “serve as a ‘safety valve’ by allowing enough room for a 
sufficiently wide range of subjects that people can let off steam about government corruption or 
incompetence…before considering taking their gripes to the streets’’ (p.33). Overall there is an 
understanding that while the spatial design of these leisure sites is often deliberately designed 
and deployed to control and regulate dissent, they also serve to gradually infuse the state with 
democratic practice and potentially broaden the public and political sphere within China.  
Indeed, ideology shaping these spaces can be wide-ranging, from libertarian as in the 
case of California with a strong drive towards social participation to authoritarianism and state 
paternalism as in the case of China. However, one must not neglect the power of commercialism 
over the functioning and usage of these public leisure realms. A case in point are London parks, 
strategically designed as symbols of a new capitalistic society, intent on leveraging a civic and 
social sphere for increased consumption (Roberts, 2001). However, they were destined to be 
marked by mass activism, moving away from the symbol of elitism and cosmopolitanism to that 
of a proletarian protest space. The royalty soon understood the need for a safety value for the 
masses and instituted the allowance of a ‘Speakers Corner’ in Hyde Park where the public was 
free to express themselves. Protesters used this social cleavage to challenge authority through 
public speech while still functioning within the legality of such spaces. The masses were able to 
appropriate and play with this space, expanding the symbolism of the urban park and thereby it’s 
functioning over time: 
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The sign ‘speech’ had carved out a distinct geographical and moral space in Hyde Park 
over a century before 1872. Constituted through the ‘last dying speeches’ of the criminal 
class of 18th-century London, this subaltern rationality rendered visible the class 
character of law by disrupting the distancing of legal discourse from governance. 
Secondly, by undertaking a genealogical investigation of the sign ‘speech’ at Hyde Park, 
the traces left by scaffold culture were re-combined to slowly translate ‘last dying 
speeches’ into a more overtly political proletarian public sphere. (Roberts, 2001, pp. 322) 
 
 
In the late 19th century, a combination of park by-laws, use of the Highways Act and venue 
licensing powers of the London County Council made it one of the few places where socialist 
speakers could meet and debate. To this day, London parks host ‘Speakers Corners’ where a 
range of social issues are covered that reveal the fragmented and pluralistic nature of protest, less 
political in the conventional sense and more of personalized and issue-based politics. Over the 
years, we have witnessed marches for a number of issues including disability rights, anti-
austerity, trade-unions against cuts, anti-pope rallies, and cabbies against block lanes during the 
Olympics. Fascinatingly, the Speakers Corner has become an institutionalized entity, forming its 
web presence and digitally consolidating around a range of ‘Speaker Corner’ projects1; they have 
exported their ideology across nations such as Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, Canada and the 
Netherlands including its underlying leisure structures.  
 It is worth considering to what extent the nature of public participation in these material 
spaces have semblance to that of digital networks. In contemporary discourse, it is claimed that 
while group-based ‘identity politics’ of the past were along conventional lines such as class, 
ethnicity, race and gender, Web 2.0 architectures have fostered more diverse mobilizations 
where individuals gather and activate around lifestyle values and engage with multiple causes 
(Bennett, 2012): 
Personalized politics has long existed, of course, in the form of populist uprisings or 
emotional bonds with charismatic leaders. The interesting difference in today’s 
15 
 
participation landscape is that widespread social fragmentation has produced 
individuation as the modal social condition in postindustrial democracies, particularly 
among younger generations. (pp. 22) 
While indeed the technical affordances of social networks facilitate this process and allow for 
virtual corners on a range of topics from the profound to the inane, can we continue to view this 
as a sole attribution to the digital sphere, given the plethora of social issues that triggered 
activism within urban parks historically? In fact, urban parks due to their unique history of 
struggle for democratic architectures, have historically allowed for temporal social collectivities 
around issues of personal concern that permeated conventional group identities, affiliations and 
politics as we have extrapolated earlier on.   
To conclude, be it People’s Park, Beijing Park, or Hyde Park, there is a normative ideal or 
best imagined use of public leisure space endorsed by the state, corporation or imperial entity 
that stands against the wide spectrum of social practice within these parks in urban societies. 
Paternalistic intent of the state or private sector interest often drives the design and shape of these 
public spaces, hoping to convert the masses into modern, cultured, and active consumers of 
society. These ideals stand for aspirations and expectations, a powerful motif that get transcribed 
and reified over time. However, through ongoing interaction and participation of the masses, 
historically these public leisure spaces have morphed into emblems of freedom and human 
dignity. The continuous public struggle to democratize these leisure realms accumulate and form 
a rich social memory of these spaces, impacting future ideology and public protest. Of course not 
all parks serve along the same lines of social activism, much like not all digital networks propel 
political participation. That said, historically and cross-culturally, there is a critical relationship 
between public leisure sites such as urban parks and social protest that cannot be ignored. They 
have served as public platforms wherein a range of ideologies have played out, and within this 
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social theatre, democratic practices have emerged time and again in spite of architectural 
manipulations and surveillance infrastructures from above. This is much along the lines of 
Lefebvre‘s (1991) distinction between representational space (appropriations and usage of park 
space by the masses) and representations of space (design and control of park space by the 
authority). Such leisure platforms take on a hybrid identity where corporate branding, political 
campaigning and propaganda battle it out. Yet, if we are to take a cue from the history of urban 
parks, if there is a critical mass that harnesses these leisure spaces for political activism time and 
again, such human persistence has the capacity to mark them as contemporary protest space that 
spans the political to the personal.   
Corporate intervention, mediation, and creative/playful protest 
“It should be clarified that a new public space is not synonymous with a new public sphere,” 
remarks Papacharissi (2002, p.11), reminding us that it is the nature of social mediation and 
interaction that make a space ‘public’ and not just its underlying architecture. In other words, just 
because social technologies create the fabric of democracy, it is still contingent on user activities 
to materialize such ideals. Hence, if you build it, as the popular adage goes, it does not mean they 
will come. So it should not be a surprise that few digital platforms gained the reputation of 
facilitating the ‘revolution’ of the Arab Spring while others were barely mentioned. In fact, many 
of these digital leisure platforms are far from the republic ideals, instead serving as pseudo public 
spaces as corporations usurp them for commercial ends (Barnes, 2006; Lange, 2007). There is 
much lament on what is seen as the progressive eroding of the digital public sphere as corporate 
marketing takes over, threatening civic engagement. In recent years, this conversation has 
become increasingly complicated with new empirical findings on ‘fan activism,’ a phenomenon 
where fans appropriate protest practices for personal causes outside the purview of traditional 
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political movements (Earl and Kimport, 2009). While some view this as empowering for 
audiences where they are able to actively participate in the shaping of their consumption 
practices (Jenkins, 2006), others view this as commercial exploitation where corporations 
leverage on political protest behavior to enhance their business practices and profit-making.  
Interestingly, if we pay attention to the trajectory of urban parks across cultures and time, 
we see a similar and challenging trend. The transformation of parks from relatively unregulated 
public space to currently corporatized, commercialized and semi-privatized space should give us 
deep cause for concern (Low, Taplin, & Scheld, 2005). The radical aspect of urban parks of the 
late 19
th
 century was that they were one of the first public sites that brought “all classes into the 
easy contact essential for democratic urban life” (Williams, 2006, p. 144).  In fact, as regulation 
started to permeate into leisure spaces, there was much opposition, as we see with that of 
People’s Park. Homeless Union activist, Andrew Jackson, puts the struggle over People‘s Park 
into a larger context:  
They’re tearing up a dream. Ever since I remember this has been a place to come. It’s 
been a place for all people, not just for some college kids to play volleyball or the white 
collar. It’s a place to lie down and sleep when you’re tired. (in Michell, 1995, pp. 113) 
People’s Park was seen as a place where the marginalized could press claims for their rights but 
with increasing control, these spaces were becoming discriminatory publics. Furthermore, malls, 
gated-communities, and corporate plazas have created ‘controlled diversity’ whereby the masses 
are differentiated based on their consumption patterns, creating a dissipated or a pseudo public 
(Cameron, 2002). Entertainment and commerce are privileged over politics, argued as 
instrumental in the shrinking of the political public sphere. This is seen as the ‘disneyfication’ of 
public space, where “the market and design considerations thus displace the idiosyncratic and 
extemporaneous interactions of engaged peoples in the determination of the shape of urban space 
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in the contemporary world” (p. 120). Besides these ‘pseudo’ public spaces, there are also ‘dead’ 
leisure spaces where too much control is exercised on a public space, converting them into 
sanitized domains that few feel compelled to inhabit. For instance, corporations taking over a 
plaza where they dictate rules of public engagement or states manufacturing public leisure 
environments where people must socialize in particular ways can result in low levels of 
engagement.  
This is not to say that people are not resourceful in circumventing and playing with 
dominant infrastructures, be it corporate or state-initiated and driven. Historically, they have 
demonstrated tremendous capacity to etch out ways of political enactment, often resorting to 
playful mediations to get heard.  From Beijing to London parks, the masses are innovative in 
their usage of space, forming human chains, holding humorous signage, dressing in costumes, 
and using theatre. This creates temporary solidarities, transforming an abstract mass into a united 
civic group that shares common political concerns (Gough, 2000; McKay, 2011). Mass 
performance is a way of communicating efficiently across a diverse public, unifying and making 
visible common messages directed to the authority of concern. “In cities across the [USA in the 
late 19
th
 century] country, a variety of groups have used public parks to stage parades, heritage 
celebrations, rallies, and protest as a means of expressing their sense of ethnic, racial, religious 
and sexual identity” (Bachin, 2003, p.16). Given the inherent challenge of creating a community 
feeling amongst a disparate group across class, gender, ethnicity and religion, playful and 
creative means of communication are essential in the formation of mass protest. What is seen as 
effective is to capture “secular ritual forms which express communal values and sentiments by 
symbolically abstracting features of the social and normative structures from which they derive” 
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(Lawrence, 1982, p. 155). In fact, if we look at mass protest within the virtual realm, we see 
parallels of such creative play.  
Take for instance the case of China and their creative modes of communicative practices 
within public leisure domains. As mentioned in the earlier section, parks in China are open yet 
deeply regulated, particularly when it comes to mass gatherings. However, there are grey zones 
sanctioned by the state that allow for crowds to amass for social purposes such as qigong, 
healing through breathing exercises that are popular with the public  (Davis et al., 1995). For this 
activity, groups engaged in this pursuit are allowed to print and distribute flyers, affix signboards 
and public announcements. Historically, this practice has deeper meaning as during the Mao era, 
this was considered as a way of fostering private mental spaces in a public setting and herein, 
“urban constructs of parks give way to private experience” (p. 359). Qigong has a long tradition 
of association with peasant uprisings and heterodox movements such as the Boxers who 
practiced qi exercises and promoted their visions of an utopic society. The popular image of 
qigong founded on media and healing narratives have created a sense of autonomous identity that 
is well entrenched in urban spaces and city life. It has unsettled the Chinese state as it is 
perceived to have political revitalization potential. Hence, there is a continuous struggle between 
the state and the public on what is deemed as public leisure enactments: 
people take up qigong because of disenchantment with official ideology and policy. The 
states presence is inserted into everyday life through surveillance of public arenas such as 
the parks. Categories of ‘official’ versus ‘false’ qigong are created to permit practitioners 
of ‘superstitious’ activities to be taken into custody for questioning. Those who continue 
to practice in parks do so under red banners and white certificates of legitimately 
recognized schools of qigong. Witch hunts of masters are carried out in the name of 
corruption. And boundaries of normality are reestablished through creating a medical 
disorder called qigong deviation. (pp. 360) 
This pattern of weaving in discontent within the larger matrix of leisure is evident in the virtual 
sphere in China. The top 10 Internet activities in China are listening to or downloading music, 
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reading news, using a search engine, instant messaging, playing games, watching videos, using a 
blog or personal space, emailing, using a social networking service, and reading literature 
(Wallis, 2011). The Chinese Internet is mainly perceived as a place for socializing and 
entertainment as users describe their web-based activities as “fun.” Yet, research has revealed 
that within this innocuous maze of public leisure, we see the emergence of diverse and creative 
communicative codes and homonyms that can only be understood by certain groups of 
participants that share interest in a common cause. For instance, there is a gay realm in the 
Chinese digital sphere that is socio-linguistically constructed through terms such as tongzhi or 
‘comrade’ (a euphemism for gay or lesbian) and other inside literature. To Giese, “the real 
subversive potential of the Internet in China arises not because BBSs (and blogs) are used for 
overtly political expression, but because of the anonymity, freedom of expression, and 
opportunity for negotiating identity that such spaces allow” (2004, p. 23). In fact, several events 
have opened up conversations on issues that go beyond initial personal politics such as the Mu 
Zimei phenomenon. Here, a young woman in Guangzhou stirred up controversy in 2003 when 
she began blogging about her active sex life, rejecting conventional notions of romantic love and 
opening up public debate on other societal matters. Yang (2009) has argued that the ‘personal is 
political’ in China, although not in the manner in which ‘Chinese politics’ is usually 
conceptualized in the West. 
Furthermore, Chinese users who want to express views the government might frown 
upon have developed technological solutions like VPNs and anonymizing tools, employing 
software that changes the direction of text as well as non-technological methods to get their 
messages out:  
For example, after the July 2009 riots involving Muslim Uyghur’s and Han Chinese in 
Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang province, all online discussion, photos, and video of this 
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event were blocked. To get around such censorship, clever Internet users employed a 
practice called ‘tomb digging,’ or ’digging up‘ earlier posts about Xinjiang or Urumqi, 
and then adding comments about the riots... Other means of avoiding censorship include 
using encoded language through relying on the use of oblique references and metaphors, 
and through taking advantage of the richness of the Chinese language, with its multiple 
homophones. Still another practice is to split headers in an otherwise blank posting so 
that the user has to pull the pieces together…Through these and other creative techniques, 
Chinese cyberspace has become a realm for polyphonic expressions to exist outside the 
dominant discourse, and as such, it is constitutive of social change in China. (Wallis, 
2011, p. 422) 
 
In fact, recent new media architectures have given birth to the practice of e’gao, a combination 
of the words ‘evil’ and ‘to make fun of’ that signifies a multimedia expression that spoofs or 
pokes fun at an original work (Jiao, 2007).Through practices such as photo-shopping images, 
creating lip-synching videos or parodies of famous films, e’gao has succeeded in appearing with 
little agenda and yet has scripted within this play, public resistance. Such forms of implicit 
protest through creative mash-ups have posed an ongoing challenge for the Chinese state as these 
are woven deeply in corporate platforms that benefit from such group participation and 
enactments.  Hence, to some extent, the deeply commercial aspects of these infrastructures 
protect the public from state censorship.  
To conclude, boundaries of inclusion and exclusion surface through the architecting, 
regulating and mediating of public leisure space by those in authority, making visible the rights 
and status of individuals and groups. Yet, in practice, communities create novel modes of 
communicative practice and maneuverings that carve out spaces of political expression. Here, 
corporations hold a complex and often contradictory position of being complicit with the state to 
regulate their citizens and yet, to create web architectures that commercially feed on such mass 
innovation and creativity that is, at times, implicitly political.  
 
Conclusion 
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Much research has being done on social network sites, particularly their potential to facilitate 
democracy through mass protest. Substantive work focuses on their evolving techno-social 
infrastructures and practices, compelling researchers to emphasize the unique spatiality of these 
virtual leisure platforms. When comparisons are made historically, it is usually along lines of old 
and new media.  Hence, to lend a fresh perspective to this popular field of new media research, 
this paper leverages on a wealth of research from a seemingly disconnected academic discipline 
– park studies. Given the shared rhetoric between urban parks and social network sites – of being 
open, free, and democratic, this paper initiates a dialogue between these two fields to lend a more 
comprehensive perspective on the relationship between public leisure space and political 
communication. By looking at case studies of urban parks and social media platforms in the 
United States, United Kingdom and China, this paper argues that public leisure domains are 
ideologically driven and symbolically marked often by state and/or corporate agendas that can be 
deemed as authoritarian, paternal or libertarian. Oftentimes, we see openness as deliberately 
architected into these spaces to serve as a safety valve and a concerted effort to gain state 
legitimacy through a modern public image. While these spaces have been designed as means of 
containment of mass politics, they often can serve as a hotbed for protest. Such ‘safety valves’ 
can over time become powerful pipelines for social movements that span across groups and 
social contexts through grassroots agency. By examining the range of political communication 
within these public domains, it is seen that they are interwoven strategically and deeply within 
acts of leisure, often concealing them from state surveillance. Also, such playful modes allow for 
the permeation of social causes across conventional group affiliations and help form temporary 
social collectives that share a common cause. Basically, commercialism serves as a double-edged 
sword as they exploit protest for corporate gain and at the same time, protect activism from being 
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controlled easily as they gain commercial validity. Overall, public leisure landscapes within the 
digital and material sphere share common agendas and architectures that when viewed as a 
comprehensive and historically embedded space, give insight into the nature of political 
participation and mass protest.  
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